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The North Carolina Supreme Court, in Brittingham v. Stadiem,1
quoted with approval the common law rule that,
Relationship does not alone make a father answerable for the
wrongful acts of his minor child. There must be something
besides relationship to connect him with such acts before he
becomes liable. It must be shown that he approved such acts,
or that the child was his servant or agent.2
Our court has consistently followed this rule.8
The 1961 General Assembly, however, has amended the rule by
enactment of G.S. § 1-538.1' which provides:
Any person, firm, corporation, the State of North Caro-
lina or any political subdivision thereof, or any religious,
educational or charitable organization, or any nonprofit ceme-
tery corporation, or organization, whether incorporated or
unincorporated, shall be entitled to recover damages in an
amount not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500.00), in an
action in a court of competent jurisdiction, from the parents
of any minor under the age of eighteen (18) years, living
with its parents, who shall maliciously or wilfully destroy
1 151 N.C. 299, 300, 66 S.E. 128, 129 (1909).
'See 39 Am. JUR. Parent & Child § 55 (1942) ; 67 C.J.S. Parent & Child
§66 (1950). Some courts have taken exceptions to this rule and broken
them down into five categories: (1) respondeat superior; (2) where the
parent entrusts a dangerous instrumentality to the child; (3) where the
parent entrusts an instrumentality to the care of a child, knowing the child
capable of inflicting injury with it; (4) where the parent has knowledge of
the child's dangerous propensities but fails to take corrective steps; and
(5) where the parent participated with the child by consenting to, or ratifying
the tortious act. See Note, 30 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 295 (1955).
The widespread application of the so-called "family purpose doctrine"
indicates that because of the common law rule the courts have gone further
to find an agency relationship in parent-child situations than in other situa-
tions.
"Lane v. Chatham, 251 N.C. 400, 111 S.E.2d 598 (1959); Hawes v.
Haynes, 219 N.C. 535, 14 S.E.2d 503 (1941); Staples v. Bruns, 218 N.C.
780, 11 S.E.2d 460 (1940); Bowen v. Mewborn, 218 N.C. 423, 11 S.E.2d
372 (1940) ; Taylor v. Stewart, 172 N.C. 203, 90 S.E. 134 (1916) ; Linville
v. Nissen, 162 N.C. 95, 77 S.E. 1096 (1913); Brittingham v. Stadiem, 151
N.C. 299, 66 S.E. 128 (1909).
'N.C. GEr. STAT. § 1-538.1 (Supp. 1961).
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property, real, personal or mixed, belonging to any such per-
son, firm, corporation, the State of North Carolina or any
political subdivision thereof, or any religious, educational or
charitable organization.
With the passage of this legislation, North Carolina joins thirty-
one other states5 which have enacted statutes imposing civil liability
upon parents for acts of their children solely because of the parent-
child relationship, and has thereby added an element to our law
which the common law had steadily refused to recognize.0
Questions of Interpretation
Several questions concerning the proper interpretation of this
statute might be raised.7
(1) Does the word "parents" include adoptive parents, step-
parents, foster parents, or any other persons standing
in loco parentis?
(2) Does imposition of liability without fault violate any
constitutional principles?
(3) Does "living with its parents" include a child away at
camp for the summer, visiting with relatives for a tem-
porary period, or other situations where the child is re-
siding away from the parents temporarily although his
domicile is with the parents?
(4) Does the statute include situations where the child is
residing with one parent only?
(5) Could $500 be recovered from each parent?
(6) Does this statute, by expressly providing for recovery
against the parent and limiting that recovery to $500,
thereby limit recovery to this amount under circum-
stances where a plaintiff may have been able to recover
considerably more under one of the exceptions to the
common law rule?
'See Appendix.
'A parallel doctrine of parental liability is well entrenched in the civil
law of Louisiana. See LA. Civ. CoDn ANN. art. 2318 (1952).
'See Peck, Parental Liability for Wilfil and Malicious Acts of Children,
36 WAsn. L. Rnv. 327 (1961). Our trial courts may have to deal with these
questions of interpretation without the benefit of Supreme Court decisions
as the amount involved would seldom justify the expense of an appeal.
[Vol. 40
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(7) At what age may a child commit an act "maliciously or
wilfully"?
Perhaps the most serious of these questions is whether the
statute creates an exclusive remedy which supersedes all other pre-
viously existing remedies. Some parental responsibility statutes
expressly provide that the remedies therein granted shall be in addi-
tion to all other remedies.' The North Carolina statute makes no
such declaration. Unless our court is willing to imply such a pro-
vision, our statute will limit recovery in some situations. For ex-
ample, suppose a parent allows his seventeen year old son to drive
the family car. The son sees his girl friend in an expensive sports
car with another boy. The son becomes enraged and wilfully drives
his car into the sports car, causing extensive damage to the sports
car. Under the existing "family purpose doctrine"9 it is likely that
full recovery could be had against the parent. To use one other
example, suppose the parents of a fifteen year old child are aware of
the fact that he has attempted to set fire to various buildings in the
past, but fail to take any action to prevent his indiscriminate use of
matches. Thereafter, the child maliciously sets fire to a neighbor's
expensive dwelling, causing it to burn to the ground. Under present
law the neighbors would probably be able to recover extensive dam-
ages from the parents.Y0 Would G.S. § 1-538.1 limit recovery in
these two situations to $500?
The question whether very young children may destroy property
"maliciously or wilfully" was discussed in the Nebraska case of
Connors v. Pantano," the only appellate court decision (outside of
Louisiana) 2 construing a parental responsibility statute.'3 There
8 For example, the California statute provides in part: "The liability
imposed by this section is in addition to any liability now imposed by law."
CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 1714.1 (Supp. 1961).
' This doctrine is defined in Watts v. Lefler, 190 N.C. 722, 725, 130 S.E.
630, 632 (1925), as follows: "'[O]ne who keeps an automobile for the
pleasure and convenience of himself and his family, is liable for injuries
caused by the negligent operation of the machine while it is being used for
the pleasure or convenience of a member of his family."' This case also
points out that this doctrine has been adopted as the law of this jurisdiction.
0 This would seem to follow from our holding in Lane v. Chatham, 251
N.C. 400, 111 S.E.2d 598 (1959).
165 Neb. 515, 86 N.W.2d 367 (1957).
For the Louisiana cases construing the Louisiana Civil Code provisions
regarding parental liability, see Annot., 155 A.L.R. 85, 96 (1945).
" Perhaps this fact is due to the low maximum recoveries allowed by the
statutes, thereby making an appeal too expensive for the amount of recovery
possible.
19621
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a child four years and seven months old set fire to the neighbor's
garage. The neighbor sued the child's parents under a Nebraska
statute making parents liable for "wilful and intentional" destruction
of realty by their children. The Nebraska court held that the child
was legally incapable of committing a wilful and intentional act
because he had not, at that tender age, sufficiently attained those
qualities of attention, intelligence, judgment, and reason that would
enable him to commit the act charged wilfully and intentionally.
The court drew an analogy between inability to commit a wilful
and intentional act and inability of a child of tender age to be con-
tributorily negligent.'- Should our court determine that the words
"maliciously or wilfully" in the North Carolina statute mean the
same thing as "wilfully and intentionally" in the Nebraska statute,
and should it further follow the Nebraska court and hold that a child
incapable of contributory negligence is incapable of committing a
malicious and wilful act, the statute would be inapplicable to acts of
children under seven years of age, since they are conclusively pre-
sumed to be incapable of contributory negligence." It would also
be of doubtful applicability to acts of children between seven and
fourteen, since they are presumed to be incapable of contributory
negligence.'" Perhaps a more accurate analogy, but one which
reaches the same result, is that between inability to commit an act
maliciously or wilfully and inability to commit a criminal act.' 7  A
still better approach might be to determine wilfulness solely on the
basis of the particular child and the particular circumstances involved.
Advisability of Statute
There is a considerable difference of opinion concerning the
advisability of statutes which in any way place liability or responsi-
"' The Nebraska court quotes from REsTATEMF T, TORTS § 283, comment
e (1934) : "If he is so young as to be manifestly incapable of exercising those
qualities of attention, intelligence, and judgement which are necessary to
enable him to perceive a risk and to realize its unreasonable character, he is
generally held incapable of contributory negligence."
"
5 Walston v. Greene, 247 N.C. 693, 102 S.E.2d 124 (1958).
" Wilson v. Bright, 255 N.C. 329, 121 S.E.2d 601 (1961); Adams v.
Board of Educ., 248 N.C. 506, 103 S.E.2d 854 (1958).
"In State v. Yeargan, 117 N.C. 706, 707, 23 S.E. 153, 154 (1895), the
court stated: "An infant under seven years of age cannot be indicted and
punished for any offense, because of the irrebutable presumption that he is
doli incapa. .... Between 7 and 14 years of age an infant is presumed to
be innocent and incapable of committing crime, but that presumption in
certain cases may be rebutted...."
[Vol. 40
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bility upon parents for acts of their children. "' There are those who
feel that such statutes serve a valid purpose in that they tend to dis-
courage juvenile delinquency."9  Others doubt this result.20  Still
others feel that such statutes in effect punish the parents, and that
this has no effect whatever in curbing juvenile delinquency or in
achieving any other desirable social end.21
Aside from the effect of these statutes on the juvenile delin-
quency problem, they do appear to the writer to have value to the
extent that they provide restorative compensation to the victims of
tortious conduct by children. When a loss has been thus sustained
it seems more equitable to require the parents to pay than to say to
the innocent victim, "too bad." Althoigh the child is liable for his
own torts, 22 it is doubtful that this is of any real value to the inno-
cent victim of his acts in most instances since children seldom have
assets with which to compensate the victim. It is believed that re-
sponsible parents normally feel a moral obligation to pay for damages
caused by their children, and that what responsible people consider
to be a moral obligation is generally a good guide for determining
what our legal responsibilities should be.23
If the element of fairness leads us to the conclusion that it is
better to require parents, even though they be without fault, to bear
the financial loss occasioned by the tortious acts of their children,
rather than to let the loss fall upon the innocent victim, questions
arise whether the liability should be limited to damage to property, 4
" In addition to articles cited in notes 19-22 infra, see Comments, 3
VILL. L. Rnv. 529 (1958) ; 34 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 222 (1956); Your Legal
Responsibility as a Parent, Changing Times, Feb. 1958, p. 33.
1 The Assistant Director of Operations and Assistant Supervisor of Plant
Security for the Dade County, Florida, schools takes the position that the
Florida parental responsibility law has resulted in a leveling off of vandalism
in the Dade County schools, and that the statute has increased the parents'
awareness of their responsibility. Colmey & Valentine, Stop Vandalism with
Parent Responsibility Laws, Am. Sch. Bd. Jour., July 1960, p. 9.
Gerald O'Brien, Prosecution Attorney of Wayne County (Detroit),
Michigan, had this to say about the Michigan parental liability law: "It has
made parents keep closer watch over the children .... Vandalism cases have
dropped 60 per cent in Detroit parks and playgrounds. In Battle Creek,
vandalism is down 55 per cent; in Pontiac 41 per cent. Last year fifteen
youth gangs operated in Detroit. Now there are none." Wyden, Are Par-
ents Responsible, Newsweek, April 2, 1956, pp. 95-96.
:'See, e.g., Peck, supra note 7.
' See Pollack, Should Parents Be Punished for their Children's Wrong
Doing, Parents Magazine, March 1955, p. 50.Ig Smith v. Kron, 96 N.C. 392, 2 S.E. 533 (1887).
"
3Insurance is available to protect against losses of this nature.
" Many of the statutes cited in the Appendix limit recovery to damages
to property and a few limit recovery to damages to school property.
1962]
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and the award limited to $500. Are the same considerations not
present when the damage is to the person? And, is liability to the
extent of $500 of very much value to an innocent victim of tortious
condudt amounting to several thousands of dollars?
Conclusion
North Carolina, along with thirty-one other states, 25 apparently
has taken the position that the two common law theories of imposing
vicarious liability upon parents for acts of their children are not suffi-
ciently extensive, and that it is therefore desirable to have a statute
making the parents liable for the child's torts under certain condi-
tions. The statute that has been enacted raises several questions of
interpretation and advisability. It is hoped that the 1963 General
Assembly will take another look at this matter and consider the
following:
(1) Should the problems of interpretation discussed above be
clarified by amendment?
(2) Should liability be extended to damages to the person?
(3) Should the $500 limitation be increased or removed?
-RODDEY M. LIGONt
26 Another state, Wisconsin, enacted a parental responsibility act in 1956
but repealed it in 1959. Wis. Laws 1959, ch. 562, § 2m.
f Assistant Director of the Institute of Government and Associate Pro-
fessor of Public Law and Government, University of North Carolina.
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APPENDIX
Year of
State Statutory original Maximum Age
reference passage* liability
Alaska .............. 22-1-7 1957 8500 18
Arizona ............. 12-661 1956 $500 Minor
Arkansas ............ 50-109 1959 $300 18
California .......... Civil Code 1955 $300 Minor
1714.1
Colorado ........... 41-2-7 1959 8300 18
Connecticut ........ 52-572 1955 8750 Minor
Delaware ........... 10-3923 1958 8300 18
Florida ............. 45.20 1956 $300 18
Georgia ............ 105-113 1956 none stated 17
Hawaii ............. 330-3 1859 none stated Minor
Idaho ............... 6-210 1957 $300 18
Indiana ............. 2-520 1957 $500 18
Kansas .............. 38-120,121 1959 8300 18
Maine .............. 166-22-A 1959 $250 7-17
Maryland** ......... 26-76(i) 1959 8500 Minor
Michigan ............ 27.1408 (1) 1958 $300 18
27.1408 (2)
Montana ............ 61-112.1, 1957 8300 18
-112.2
Nebraska ............ 43-801 1951 none stated Minor
Nevada ............. 41.470 1957 $300 18
New Mexico ......... 22-21-1 1957 $500 18
22-21-2
North Carolina ....... 1-538.1 1961 $500 18
North Dakota ....... 32-03-39 1957 $300 18
Oklahoma ........... 23-10 1957 $300 18
Oregon .............. 30.770 1959 $100 18
Rhode Island ........ 9-1-3 1956 8250 Minor
South Dakota ........ 14.0309-1 1957 $300 18
Tennessee' ........ 37-1001-1003 1957 $300 18
Texas ............... Civil Stat. 1957 8300 10-18
5923-1
Vermont ............ 15-901 1959 8250 17
Virginia ............. 8-654.1 1960 8200 18
Washington .......... Laws 1961 1961 $300 18
Ch. 99
West Virginia ........ 5482(2),(3) 1957 8300 18
* Note that most of these statutes were enacted in very recent years.
** Applies to Montgomery County only.
*** No recovery is to be had, however, if the parent or guardian of the
person shows due care and diligence in his care and supervision of such
minor.
